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PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE 
 
Abstract 
Although moral cleansing has frequently been documented, existing evidence remains mixed 
and the prerequisite for its occurrence remain unclear. We argue that the saliency of moral 
misbehavior is decisive: we hypothesize that moral cleansing is only triggered if people 
strongly deviate from their own moral identity. We test our conjecture using an incentivized 
experiment. We find that moral cleansing indeed occurs following salient deviations. 
Moreover, we also observe that cleansing behaviors depend on participants’ initial morality. 
  
1. Introduction 
People often engage in morally inconsistent behaviors that seem paradoxical. For example, 
individuals who engage in morally questionable actions sometimes follow up on these actions 
with particularly moral behavior. Such inconsistent patterns may be the consequence of an 
attempt to recover ones moral identity ensuing a misbehavior. Individuals who realize that their 
past behavior conflicts with their own moral code tend to experience disgust (e.g., Chapman & 
Anderson, 2013) and may respond with what has been termed “moral cleansing” (Lee & 
Schwarz, 2021, Gneezy, Imas, & Madarász, 2014, Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009).1 
Although ample evidence for morally inconsistent behavior exists (e.g., Effron, 
Cameron, & Monin, 2009; Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), 
investigations of the underlying mechanisms yielded mixed results: the same people who 
engage in moral cleansing in some cases don’t do so in other situation, but the reasons remain 
unclear (Dolan & Galizzi, 2015). We argue that one factor which is decisive for whether moral 
cleansing is triggered or not is the saliency of the misbehavior. We hypothesize that large 
deviations from one’s moral identity require repair through moral cleansing, whereas small 
deviations remain unnoticed or are tolerated and therefore tend to lead to continued 
misbehavior. 
We test our conjecture with an incentivized experiment in which we first measure 
participants initial morality before we expose them to a stimulus that aims at triggering 
unexpected reactions. In the final phase we then observe participants’ behavior once the 
stimulus has been removed. Our treatments vary the intensity of the stimulus to trigger 
deviations of different magnitude and saliency.  
 
1 The opposite pattern—moral behavior followed by immoral actions—is called “moral licensing”.  
2. Theoretical background 
While individuals like to believe they are consistent, especially when it comes to 
morality, research shows that they systematically deviate from their own moral code 
(Bazerman & Gino, 2012; Bazerman & Sezer, 2016; Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). As such, 
individuals can be described as boundedly ethical (see also Chugh & Bazerman, 2007; Chugh, 
Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005). Echoing the seminal work of Herbert Simon (1955, 1956), 
bounded ethicality assumes that individuals are only boundedly aware of their own limitations 
as well as the moral aspect of certain situations2. For instance, individuals believe they are 
moral and objective (Messick & Bazerman, 1996; Tenbrunsel, 1998). Being boundedly ethical 
then serves a self-preservation purpose – it protects the moral self (Chugh et al., 2005). 
However, this distorted self-image is exactly what prevents individuals from seeing relevant 
information when making moral decisions (Bazerman & Sezer, 2016; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 
2004; Zhang, Fletcher, Gino, & Bazerman, 2015), as they tend not to see when a moral decision 
involves conflicts of interests (Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2006) and fail to focus on 
morally relevant information (Bazerman & Sezer, 2016; Chugh & Bazerman, 2007). While the 
framework of bounded ethicality places the moral self and moral self-image at the centre of its 
explanations, it says little about the psychological mechanisms underlying misbehaviours nor 
the reaction to misbehaviours.   
Part of the psychological literature on (im)moral behaviours has focused on individuals’ 
reactions to their own misbehaviours. Indeed, for most individuals such misbehaviours come 
as a paradox between one’s moral identity and behaviour and have to be rationalized one way 
or another (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). There are various ways through which individuals 
 
2 While certain behavioral patterns appear to be internally inconsistent, scholars have argued 
that they may result from the application of morally neutral decision strategies to moral 
contexts and can therefore be understood by taking the environment into account (see 
Fleischhut & Gigerenzer, 2013). 
deal with identity conflicts ranging from psychological to behavioural. Some scholars have 
focused on how individuals detach themselves from their decisions, their outcomes, or their 
victims (e.g., Bandura, 1990, 1999, 2002; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996), 
but the part of the literature that is most relevant for this work has focused on how individuals 
compensate for their own misbehaviours (moral cleansing3). Moral cleansing is used to 
describe the behaviour of an individual who behaves morally after having behaved immorally, 
in order to compensate for the previous behaviour (Sachdeva et al., 2009; Stone, Aronson, 
Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). However, while moral cleansing 
has been experimentally observed in some instances (e.g., Gneezy, Imas, & Madarász, 2014), 
there were also several failures to replicate the phenomenon, indicating that the mechanism 
triggering the behaviour has not yet been fully understood (Dolan & Galizzi, 2015).  
To investigate the mechanisms behind moral cleansing, we propose to distinguish 
between salient and inconspicuous misbehaviours. As saliency is likely to draw attention, it 
may act as a stimulus and trigger a reaction from the individual. For example, the participants 
in Milgram’s (1963, 1965) experiments on obedience to authority, faced a very salient 
misbehaviour as they were instructed to punish another individual with potentially harmful and 
even fatal electric shocks. As a reaction, several participants verbally expressed their 
discomfort and even lied to the experimenter to avoid hurting others. However, if a 
misbehaviour is inconspicuous then individuals simply cannot react, due to the lack of stimuli. 
This second case is what the framework of bounded ethicality qualifies as a blind spot (Chugh 
et al., 2005), or numbness (Bazerman & Sezer, 2016). We therefore argue that one’s moral 
identity serves as a reference point. If an individual believes they are highly moral and 
 
3 While part of the literature on moral cleansing focuses on symbolic physical manifestations 
such as washing one’s hands with soap or using a cleaning wipe after recalling a misbehavior 
(e.g., Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), I focus on behavioral cleansing in a broader sense as I 
include any form on compensation for pasts immoral behaviors.  
misbehaves, the discrepancy between their identity beliefs and actual behaviour will be large 
and therefore salient. This salient difference between beliefs and reality can be thought of as a 
moral “burn” and will stimulate the need for cleansing behaviours. On the contrary, if the 
misbehaviour is inconspicuous, then this behaviour may be taken as a signal of one’s identity 
(Akerlof & Kranton, 2000, 2005; Ariely & Norton, 2008; Bem, 1972). Consequently, it will 
serve as a new reference point and the moral identity of the individual will be shifted. In turn, 
this shift of reference point will increase the likelihood of repeating the past behaviour, 
although the latter will no longer be considered as such due to the identity being adapted. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that salient moral dissonance has a positive impact on the likelihood 
of future moral behaviours. This behavioural pattern – a misbehaviour triggering a better 
behaviour – is a behavioural expression of moral cleansing.  
Hypothesis 1: A salient moral dissonance is more likely to lead to a subsequent moral 
behaviour than an inconspicuous moral dissonance. 
Conversely, we hypothesize that a moral dissonance that is inconspicuous has a 
negative impact on the likelihood of future moral behaviours.  
Hypothesis 2: An inconspicuous moral dissonance is more likely to lead to a subsequent 
misbehaviour than a salient moral dissonance. 
To summarize, we posit that prior misbehaviours can lead to either moral cleansing or 
subsequent misbehaviours. We propose that the saliency of the prior misbehaviour is what 
drives the two opposing behavioural patterns. The role of saliency in triggering subsequent 
misbehaviors is summarized in Figure 1. 
  
FIGURE 1. Theoretical Model for the Link between Prior and Subsequent Misbehaviours, 
Moderated by the Saliency of the Moral Dissonance 
 
3. Experimental design and procedures 
We recruited 615 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants completed 30 rounds 
of the effort task described by Abeler, Falk, Goette, and Huffman (2011). Participants were 
paid a fixed compensation of 6 USD, for an average completion time of 50 minutes (7.12 USD 
per hour).  
The design had three parts of 10 rounds. The task consisted in counting the number of 
ones in a table randomly filled with ones and zeros. In each round participants could choose 
between a large and a small table. For the participant a part of the experiment was completed 
once 10 tables had been correctly completed (irrespective of the type of table). Completing 
small tables therefore had the advantage that the participants could complete the experiment 
faster for the same payment. However, completing a table also had an externality on a charity: 
completing a large table increased the donation to a charity by 10 cents, whereas completing a 
small table removed 1 cent from the donation. In the first part of the experiment all participants 
faced the same conditions: small tables contained 6 lines, large tables contained 9 lines. In the 
second part, participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions. In 
the control condition (C) the size of small and large tables remained as in part 1. In the small 
(S) and high (H) temptation treatments, the size of the small tables was reduced to 5 and 3 lines, 
respectively. In the third part the size of small tables was reverted to 6 lines for all participants. 
See Appendix A for the screenshots of the experimental tasks for each condition. 
4. Results 
3.1 General pattern 
Figure 1 provides an overview of participants choices in all three parts. We test the statistical 
significance of observed effect with an OLS estimation in which we regress high effort 
(measured as the proportion of large tables) in each part of the experiment on indicator 
variables for treatments (Low, High), parts of the experiment (Part 2, Part 3) and the interaction 
effects of those variables (see column (1) of Table 1). 
In part 1—which is the same for all participants—the proportion of large tables is very 
similar in all three conditions (C: 0.39, L: 0.37, H: 0.39, none of the differences are statistically 
significant). In the control question high effort drops insignificantly in part 2 (0.35, p = 0.274) 
and the remains roughly constant in part 3 (0.34). 
In the low temptation condition there is an intermediate drop in the proportion of high 
effort when the participants face a slightly stronger temptation to pick the small tables in part 
2 (0.30, p = 0.038). As expected, this effect is not reversed in part 3 when incentives return to 
the initial level (0.29). Although this pattern is observationally consistent with our prediction, 
a diff-in-diff test reveals that neither the decrease from part 1 to part 2 is not significantly larger 
than the pure time trend in the control condition (p=0.283). 
In the high temptation condition we see a more pronounced drop in high effort in part 
2 (0.23, p < 0.001). This effect is partially undone in part 3 when incentives are set back to 
their initial level (0.33, p = 0.008). The diff-in-diff analysis shows that decrease in part 2 of the 
high temptation conditions is significantly larger than those in the low temptation condition 
(p=0.004) and the control condition (p=0.000). Moreover, also the increase from part 2 to part 
3 is significantly different from the developments in the other two conditions (p < 0.001 in both 
cases). 
Observationally, the overall pattern of these results is consistent with our hypothesis. 
However, from a statistical point of view, only the effects in the high temptation condition 
reach significance. However, an F test for individual fixed effects indicated that individuals 
vary greatly in terms of their initial effort provision as well as their reactions to the treatments 
(p < 0.001). Therefore, we conducted further analyses to identify types and investigate different 
reactions to the magnitudes of temptation. The next section therefore uses finite mixture models 
to investigate whether the general pattern is a combination of interesting type-specific effects. 
 
Fig. 1. Average proportion of high effort (large tables) counted by the participants across parts, 
per treatment. The graphic at the top is the overall pattern, while the three graphics at the bottom 
are the patterns for each of the three identified types of individuals. The error bars represent 
plus/minus one standard deviation. 
Table 1 
Mean immediate and delayed treatment effects of the choices of high efforts for the whole 
sample, and the three types identified by the Finite Mixture Model. 
 Pooled regressions Type analysis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Constant 0.41399 *** 0.30698 *** 0.094*** 1.01*** 0.637*** 
 (0.01237) (0.02752) (0.015) (0.017) (0.026) 
Low*Part2 -0.02850 -0.02769 0.012 0.04 -0.242*** 
 (0.02092) (0.02507) (0.02) (0.025) (0.068) 
High*Part2 -0.11353 *** -0.10930 *** 0.011 -0.157** -0.408*** 
 (0.02055) (0.02479) (0.02) (0.057) (0.057) 
Low*Part3 -0.02700 -0.02716 0.024 0.034 -0.267*** 
 (0.02092) (0.02507) (0.025) (0.033) (0.068) 
High*Part3 -0.01015 0.00025 0.062* 0.048† -0.284*** 
 (0.02055) (0.02479) (0.028) (0.028) (0.067) 
Low -0.01900 -0.01024 0.004 
 (0.01479) (0.01775) (0.019) 
High -0.00173 0.00582 -0.015 
 (0.01453) (0.01753) (0.019) 
Part2 -0.00510 -0.00395 -0.005 
 (0.01904) (0.02267) (0.019) 
Part3 0.02729 0.04734 0.027 
 (0.02818) (0.03386) (0.029) 
Round -0.00409 *** -0.00443 ** -0.004*** 
 (0.00120) (0.00145) (0.016) 
Sex  -0.07974 ***    
  (0.00860)    
Age  0.02585 ***    
  (0.00197)    
N 18450 12450    
R2 0.01188 0.03334    
Sigma   0.281 
   (0.007) 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; † p < 0.1 
 
3.2 Type analysis 
We identify type-specific patterns using a finite mixture model (FMM) (see Bruhin, Fehr-
Duda, and Epper 2010, for a similar approach). Assuming that types may differ in terms of 
initial moral behavior, as well as immediate, and delayed reactions to the treatments, the FMM 
cleanly identified three types (see Table 2). 
Table 2  
Proportions of Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3 individuals. 
 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Proportion 0.573 0.229 0.197 
SE (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) 
 
Type 1. Type 1 individuals display a low initial moral identity, as they rarely exert high 
effort in part 1 (0.055, averaged across conditions). Type 1 participants have no relevant 
reactions to the treatments, as they are already exerting the lowest possible amount of effort. 
Type 2. Type 2 individuals initially provide almost only high efforts, displaying a really 
high moral identity (0.95, averaged across conditions). They only react to the high temptation 
treatment, decreasing their efforts significantly more than in the low temptation treatment 
(p=0.002) and in the control condition (p=0.001). Moreover, participants in the high 
temptation treatment increased their proportion of high efforts significantly more than 
participants in the low temptation treatment (p=0.001) and in the control condition (p=0.001). 
This final proportion in the high temptation treatment was not significantly different from the 
ones in the control treatment (p=0.188) nor the low temptation treatment (p=0.798). In 
summary, Type 2 participants are only sensitive to high temptations, yet they cleanse fully 
from their deviation by recovering their initial moral behavior.  
Type 3. Type 3 individuals display an intermediate moral identity. They provided a 
moderate initial level of high effort (0.69, averaged across conditions). Type 3 individuals 
respond to both the low (p<0.001) and the high temptations treatments (p<0.001) in part 2, 
both reactions are significantly different from the drop in the control condition (p=0.006 and 
p<0.001, respectively), but the reactions are not significantly different (p=0.197). In part 3, 
Type 3 participants in the low temptation treatment did not change efforts significantly 
differently from participants in the control condition (p=0.783), while participants in the high 
temptation treatment increased their proportion of high efforts significantly more than 
participants in the low temptation treatment (p=0.047) and in the control condition 
(p=0.021).However, the final proportion of high efforts in the high temptation treatment is 
significantly smaller than the one in the control condition (p=0.005), yet not significantly 
different from the one in the low temptation treatment (p=0.650). In consequences, while Type 
3 individuals cleansed after facing a salient deviation, they failed to recover their initial 
morality. 
The type-based analysis nicely explains our aggregated results. A challenge in our data 
set is that 57% of the participants do not react to either treatment, because their initial effort 
level is already so low that a further decrease is almost impossible (floor effect). On the other 
extreme, another 23% of our participants exhibit a strong moral identity and therefore only 
deviate from their initial behavior if the temptation is high. The effects of the low temptation 
treatment are therefore exclusively driven by the remaining fraction of participants (20%) who 
respond to both our treatments—largely in the expected way. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
The present experimental evidence supports the assumption that salient moral 
deviations increase the likelihood of moral cleansing, while inconspicuous deviations lead to 
subsequent misbehaviors. However, this only holds for individuals with a moderate initial 
moral behavior, as they are sensitive to both high and low temptations. These results emphasize 
the importance of measuring initial morality in the study of morally inconsistent behavioral 
patterns such as moral cleansing. We therefore expect future research to further investigate the 
various degrees of moral cleansing, depending on the magnitude of deviations. 
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Appendix A-1. Choice between the small and large tables as displayed on the participants' 
screen in the first and third parts. 
 
Appendix A-2. Choice between the small and large tables as displayed on the participants' 
screen in the second part (control condition). 
 
Appendix A-3. Choice between the small and large tables as displayed on the participants' 
screen in the second part (low temptation condition). 
 
 
Appendix A-4. Choice between the small and large tables as displayed on the participants' 




Distributions of the posterior probabilities of belonging to types, based on the results of the 
Finite Mixture Models (K = 3) 
 
 
